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A limited representation agreement is an agreement where a lawyer agrees to undertake some services for a client, but does not agree to handle the client’s entire case. One example of a limited representation agreement is where a lawyer agrees to help a pro se litigant by writing briefs or discovery materials but does not agree to go to Court or handle depositions. Some courts have resisted these agreements and have sanctioned lawyers who have agreed to provide limited services to clients.

In Persels & Associates, LLC v. Capital One Bank, (USA), N.A., 2012-CA-001447-MR, the Supreme Court of Kentucky heard an appeal by three lawyers who entered into limited representation agreements with pro se clients and were sanctioned by a trial court judge.

Sarah Jackson and David Thomas, individual debtors, retained two lawyers to provide limited representation. According to the opinion, the limited representation agreements provided that neither lawyer “was required to sign pleadings, enter an appearance, or attend court proceedings.” Instead, the lawyers assisted the debtors in preparing pleadings. In 2011, the Circuit Court ordered the two lawyers to appear and show cause why they should not be held in contempt. After a hearing the Court held that the lawyers violated Kentucky’s Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and fined each of them $1.00.

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The Minnesota Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue of the unauthorized practice of law. The question it considered is whether a complaint signed by a lawyer who was unlicensed is a nullity or whether the defect can be cured. This is an important question and it has been considered by other states.

The highlights of the court’s reasoning are as follows:

The Minnesota rules of court are clear on the need for pleadings such as a complaint to be signed by an attorney licensed in Minnesota. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01; Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 5. A complaint lacking the signature of a Minnesota attorney is defective. The rules also require a summons to be “subscribed by the plaintiff or by the plaintiff’s attorney.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.01. In keeping with statutory requirements that attorneys not licensed in Minnesota may not practice in the state, see Minn. Stat. § 481.02, we conclude that the Rule 4.01 imperative that a summons be subscribed by the plaintiff “or by the plaintiff’s attorney” requires that a summons not subscribed by the plaintiff be subscribed by an attorney licensed to practice in Minnesota. Accordingly, a summons is defective if it is not subscribed by either the plaintiff or an attorney licensed to practice law in Minnesota. Here, both the summons and the complaint were defective.

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This is a legal malpractice case arising out of a divorce case. Plaintiff alleged that her ex-husband concealed assets during the divorce case and that her lawyers were negligent in failing to discover those assets. The lawyer defendants moved to dismiss the case, but the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York reversed and ordered that the case be dismissed.

Reasoning: The court recited the elements for a legal malpractice case (a) duty; (b) breach of duty; (c) proximate causation (that the plaintiff suffered a loss caused by the lawyer’s conduct) and (d) ascertainable damages. In the case of a settlement of the underlying case, the plaintiff must prove that the settlement of the action was effectively compelled by the lawyer’s action.

In this case, the court held that there was no proof that the plaintiff was compelled to enter into the settlement by the lawyer’s actions because the plaintiff was aware, before she settled, that her husband had concealed assets. The court explained: “Here, to the extent that the complaint asserted that the appellants were negligent in failing to ascertain the full extent of the assets of the plaintiff’s former husband, it failed to sufficiently allege that the stipulation of settlement entered into was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel, since the plaintiff acknowledged that she elected to enter into the settlement agreement even though she was aware that her former husband had not fully disclosed his assets.”

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This is a legal malpractice case from Mississippi where the plaintiff hired an attorney, Omar Nelson, to bring a wrongful death action against the makers of Plavix. The plaintiff alleged that she asked Nelson to handle the case when he was an associate with the law firm, Sweet and Freese. Nelson declined and recommended other counsel. Later, when Nelson left Sweet and Freese, he began working on the case again. Eventually, Nelson obtained a settlement of $280,000 for the plaintiff. The settlement was approved by the court.

Plaintiff’s legal malpractice theory was that Nelson had not obtained a sufficient settlement for the case and that other lawyers would have obtained more. This theory, without further evidence of negligence such as a failure to take discovery or obtain evidence, is very weak. It is almost entirely speculative. How are we to know why a different attorney would have obtained more money than the attorney who actually handled the case?

Plaintiff’s expert was Freese who testified that had he handled the case he would have obtained more money for the plaintiff.

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Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed a legal fee award because the lawyers who obtained the award failed to retain copies of their written timesheets after they entered the data into a computer program. Aliano v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 143367.

The plaintiff sought recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act alleging that Sears had wrongfully collected sales tax on the entire sale price of certain digital-to-analog converter boxes even though a portion of the price was subsidized by a federal program which provided coupons that were exempt from Illinois sales tax.

Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining class certification and opted to go to trial. At trial, plaintiff prevailed and won a judgment of $3.10. Plaintiff then filed a fee petition seeking $252,402.08 in legal fees. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the petition for legal fees and awarded $157,813.53. Sears appealed. Opinion ¶ 3.

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The case at issue here, Tuggle Schiro & Lichtenberger, P.C., v. Country Preferred Insurance Company, 2015 IL App (4th) 141036-U is an unpublished opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District.

The fee dispute arose out of an automobile accident case. The plaintiff, Carroll Watson, who was insured by County Preferred suffered injuries as a result of an automobile accident. Watson hired Tuggle Schiro & Lichtenberger (Tuggle) to represent him in the litigation. Watson also submitted medical bills to County Preferred, which made payments directly to medical providers. The medical payments made by County Preferred exhausted the policy’s $50,000 limit of medical payments.

The Tuggle firm obtained a settlement of $100,000 from the party that caused the auto accident. Additionally, the Tuggle firm obtained a payment of $150,000 from County Preferred on Watson’s uninsured motorist coverage. County Preferred asserted its right to take a credit of $50,000 for payments it made for medical payments for Watson.

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In this case, a taxi driver was advised by his bankruptcy lawyers to file a Chapter 7 case. The lawyers apparently failed to realize that the taxi driver owned a taxi medallion and that, in a Chapter 7 case, the medallion would be sold by the Trustee to cover the taxi driver’s debts.

The case is unusual because the debtor obtained new counsel who converted his case from Chapter 7 (liquidation) to Chapter 11 (reorganization). Successor counsel also filed a legal malpractice claim in the bankruptcy court. That court held that the first set of bankruptcy lawyers were liable and awarded economic damages. The decision is summarized below:

On September 16, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court issued the PFC. PFC at 27. In the PFC, the Bankruptcy Court found that Defendants committed malpractice by advising Plaintiff to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7. PFC at 18. Specifically the Bankruptcy Court found that: (1) Defendants were aware that Plaintiff owned a taxicab and taxi medallion prior to Plaintiff filing under Chapter 7 bankruptcy, (2) Defendants acknowledged that advising Plaintiff to file under Chapter 7 was error given Plaintiff’s assets, (3) Defendants made numerous errors in preparation of the Chapter 7 petition and failed to adequately correct those errors, (4) Defendants “abandoned” Plaintiff by failing to address the Trustee’s motions or advise Plaintiff of his right to convert to a favorable chapter which led to substantial administrative expenses, and (5) Defendants’ negligent representation was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages. PFC at 14-20.

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The case is captioned Illinois State Bar Association Mutual Insurance Company v. Thomas W. Burkhart, et al., 2015 IL App (4th) 140936-U.

An attorney, Thomas Burkhart, represented Robert and Elizabeth Wilson in a real estate transaction and related litigation. That litigation ultimately resulted in a jury verdict of $30,000 for the Wilsons. Opinion ¶ 9. The proceeds were deposited with the Bank of Edwardsville.

In 2005, trouble arose when Burkhart filed a motion in the state court case seeking $35,806.85 in legal fees, apparently $5,806.85 more than the amount of the jury verdict. The Wilsons responded with a counterclaim for negligence and legal malpractice. Burkhart tendered the defense of the claims to ISBA Mutual, which agreed to pay for Burkhart’s defense.

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Source: MCZ DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC, Dist. Court, ND Illinois 2015 – Google Scholar

This case involves allegations that the law firm (Dickinson Wright) committed legal malpractice in connection with work on a proposed “Indian casino project” in Oklahoma.

During the representation Plaintiffs requested that the law firm “to provide an opinion on any issues that might preclude the proposed gaming project from successfully moving forward.”

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Source: GOESEL v. BOLEY INTERNATIONAL (HK) LTD., Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 2015 – Google Scholar

This case concerns an appeal by a law firm of a decision by the district court to reduce a contingent fee award.

The parties agreed to a contingent fee under which the lawyers would receive one-third of any award and the expenses would be covered by the clients.

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