One of the more challenging areas of legal malpractice occurs when an expected beneficiary of a will or trust is disinherited. Was that the result of an error by the lawyer? That raises further issues. Why should the expected beneficiary (“I thought I was going to inherit Blackacre”) have a right to sue a lawyer for legal malpractice when he did not hire the lawyer himself? The lawyer is hired by the testator. These are hard questions and a New Jersey case, Christakos v. Boyadis, 262 N.J. 447, 348 A.3d 966 (2026) decided earlier this year, has addressed them.
The central question in Christakos is whether a lawyer who drafts a will owes a duty of care to a non-client relative who expected to inherit, so that the relative can sue the lawyer for malpractice. The Court held that New Jersey decides that question under Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51(2) and (3). It also held that the testators’ niece, Helen Christakos, could not meet either subsection. (348 A.3d at 970, 979.) The case’s holding has the effect of limiting the lawyer’s liability to the non-client.
Facts
The family and the 2003 wills. Peter and Nicholas (“Nick”) Christakos were elderly brothers who lived together in their childhood home in Clifton. Neither ever married or had children. In 2003 they signed mirror-image wills. Each left his estate to the other brother. If the other brother had died, the estate went in equal shares, per stirpes, to two of their brothers, Constantine and James. Plaintiff Helen Christakos is James’s daughter and a California lawyer. Plaintiff Despina (Alice) Christakos is James’s widow. Because James and Constantine had died by 2017, only Helen and Constantine’s daughter Alexis stood to inherit under the 2003 wills. Helen was also named attorney-in-fact under 2001 powers of attorney. She knew about neither the wills nor the POAs. (Id. at 970.)
How Boyadjis was retained. In July 2017, after Peter told Helen he was worried about his health and about Nick, Helen emailed defendant Anthony Boyadjis, an acquaintance. She asked whether he could help her uncles “get their affairs in order.” She said they might want to leave money to neighbors, and that she was happy to help, or to be “kept out of the loop.” After that email, Helen had no contact with Boyadjis until Peter died. (Id. at 970–71.)
Error No. 1: misreading the 2003 wills. At a July 25, 2017 meeting, Peter showed Boyadjis the 2003 will. Boyadjis told him that if one brother predeceased the other, the children of all the siblings would inherit. He later admitted that was wrong: only Helen and Alexis would have taken. Boyadjis said that Peter was “adamant” that the nieces and nephews not inherit and asked for new wills. (Id. at 971.)
Later meetings and the 2018 wills.
- November 2017. Boyadjis’s one-page handwritten notes list possible beneficiaries with blank amounts: “Neighbor Adrian Cruz $?”, “St. George $?”, “Charities?”, “Alice Christakos $“, and “Helen Christakos $.” Boyadjis testified that Peter said he “may want to give something to Helen” and that Helen was “not as bad as the other” nieces and nephew. (Id.)
- January 3, 2018. Both brothers were hospitalized. On Peter’s instructions, Boyadjis prepared wills leaving everything to the surviving brother, with the alternate residuary split equally among Maria and Francisco Cruz (the neighbors), the St. George Greek Orthodox Church, and Alice. Peter signed in the hospital. Boyadjis judged that Nick was not competent that day, so Nick did not sign. (Id. at 971–72.)
- April 7, 2018. Nick signed his 2018 will after Boyadjis found him “lucid.” But a psychiatrist had found on March 28, 2018 that Nick had moderate to severe cognitive impairment and likely Alzheimer’s disease, and recommended a guardian. A second physician agreed on April 10. One of the attesting witnesses testified that the doctors’ findings were true on the day Nick signed. (Id. at 972.)
Error No. 2: the wrong dispositive clause. The brothers meant for each to leave his entire estate to the survivor. The 2018 wills, however, passed only personal property to the surviving brother and sent the rest to the Cruzes, the Church, and Alice. Boyadjis admitted this error. (Id.)
Peter’s death and his note to Nick. Peter died April 11, 2018. Afterward, an undated note from Peter to Nick was found. It said that if Nick died first, Peter would leave everything to “Mariann and the Church” because “there’s no one else who gives a dam!!!” Helen was not mentioned. (Id.)
Guardianship proceedings. The County moved to appoint Helen as Nick’s guardian. The court-appointed attorney objected, reporting that Nick did not want Helen or his “family from California” involved in his affairs. Nick died October 2, 2018. (Id. at 972–73.)
Procedural History
Probate. Helen filed caveats against both 2018 wills. Boyadjis sued to reform Peter’s will and to have it probated. Helen eventually sought to probate Nick’s 2003 will instead. The probate matters were consolidated. In a January 18, 2023 consent order, the court:
- admitted the modified 2018 wills to probate;
- approved $100,000 each to the Cruz family and the Church, and $53,000 to the interim administrator;
- gave the rest of the estates (valued at roughly $915,000 to over $1 million) to Alice; and
- appointed Helen Administrator C.T.A. after Boyadjis renounced. (Id. at 973 & n.5.)
Malpractice action. In January 2020, Helen and Alice sued Boyadjis individually for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and related claims. Neither was his client. Their duty theory was that, as the lawyer preparing the estate plans, he owed a duty of care to the beneficiaries. They alleged that he:
- misread the 2003 wills and so caused Peter to want new ones;
- left the estate to Alice, the neighbors, and the Church instead of the surviving brother;
- left Helen out of the 2018 wills; and
- signed Peter’s name on contracts even though Helen was the attorney-in-fact.
Their expert, Ronald L. Davison, Esq., opined that Boyadjis owed the beneficiaries a duty because he knew or should have known that his services were meant to benefit them and that negligence would harm them. Davison said Boyadjis breached that duty by misadvising the brothers about the 2003 wills, drafting the 2018 wills negligently, and having Nick sign without properly confirming his capacity.
On damages, Alice sought the payments made to the Cruzes, the Church, and the administrator. Helen sought about $575,000 in legal fees. (Id. at 973.)
Summary judgment motion. Boyadjis moved for summary judgment on three grounds:
- he owed plaintiffs, as non-clients, no duty of care;
- there was no proximate cause or damages, because Alice received far more under the 2018 wills than Helen could have received under the 2003 wills; and
- judicial estoppel barred plaintiffs from attacking Nick’s capacity, since they had asked the probate court to admit his 2018 will. (Id.)
The trial court denied summary judgment and held that the lawyer’s duty did extend to both non-client plaintiffs. It reasoned that they were “known potential beneficiaries of the estates” and that Boyadjis knew his work in misreading the old wills and drafting new ones “would reasonably affect Plaintiffs as beneficiaries.” The court left breach and proximate cause to the jury. (Id. at 973–74.) In substance it used a foreseeability test, which the Supreme Court later rejected.
Appellate Division. The Appellate Division granted leave for an interlocutory appeal and affirmed in part and reversed in part. It drew on several tests for non-client duty: Pivnick, Albanese, Petrillo, Banco Popular, Restatement § 51(3), and Stewart v. Sbarro.
- Alice: Boyadjis owed her a duty to draft Peter’s will correctly, because the wills were meant to benefit her.
- Helen: No duty. The record was “bereft of evidence” that Helen was an intended beneficiary of the 2018 wills. The undisputed evidence showed the brothers did not want their nieces and nephew to inherit, so Helen would not have taken even without the errors.
- The court rejected Boyadjis’s judicial estoppel and proximate cause arguments and remanded. (Id. at 974.)
New Jersey Supreme Court.
The main issue is whether, and under what standard, Boyadjis’s duty of care to his clients, Peter and Nick, extended to Helen, a non-client relative. (Id. at 970.) The parties and the amicus framed it this way:
- Plaintiffs: Helen was an intended beneficiary to whom a duty ran. Plaintiffs argued the Appellate Division “ignored two critical facts”:
- Boyadjis admitted he knew Helen was an intended beneficiary of the 2018 wills.
- Nick’s 2018 will was void for lack of capacity. Without Boyadjis’s misreading, no 2018 wills would have been drafted, and Nick’s 2003 will, under which Helen would have taken, was the proper will to probate.
In the alternative, they argued that statements and admissions in the record showed Helen was an intended beneficiary even if the 2018 wills were valid. (Id. at 974.)
- Boyadjis: which test governs non-client duty. Boyadjis said the Appellate Division was split between a communication-based test (Estate of Albanese v. Lolio) and a foreseeability test (Stewart v. Sbarro, which follows Lucas v. Hamm). He urged the Court to adopt Albanese or the Restatement, especially § 51 cmt. f, illustration 4, which bars an heir’s claim that a lawyer negligently helped an incompetent client execute a will. (Id. at 974–75.)
- NJSBA: keep the duty to non-clients narrow. The Bar Association urged the Court not to expand a lawyer’s duty to non-clients beyond the two settled categories:
- the lawyer intends to induce, and does induce, a non-client’s reasonable reliance (Banco Popular); and
- the lawyer knows that benefiting the non-client is a primary objective of the representation (Pivnick).
It also argued that under Saffer v. Willoughby, fee-shifting in malpractice cases is limited to intentional breaches of fiduciary duty by a lawyer acting as a fiduciary for a non-client. (Id. at 975.)
Disposition
Affirmed. The Court said non-client claims against lawyers are “exceedingly narrow” (quoting Green v. Morgan Props.). It formally adopted Restatement § 51(2) and § 51(3), including comment f. It expressly rejected the Lucas/Stewart six-factor balancing test, and it declined to adopt a separate “communication-based” test, reading Albanese as not establishing one. (Id. at 975–79.) Therefore, Boyadjis owed Helen no duty:
- Under § 51(2) (invited reliance): Nobody invited Helen to rely on Boyadjis, and she did not rely on him. She had no contact with him before Peter died. (Id. at 979.)
- Under § 51(3)(a) (intended beneficiary): Helen’s intended-beneficiary status does not appear on the face of the wills, so she had to show by clear and convincing evidence that the brothers told Boyadjis they meant to benefit her (illus. 3; Pivnick). The notes with “Helen Christakos $___” and the “may want to give something to Helen” testimony were too vague to meet that standard. Three things pointed the other way: Peter’s note to Nick, Nick’s statements in the guardianship report, and the brothers’ repeated statements that the nieces and nephew should not inherit. (Id. at 979–80.)
- Capacity theory: Rejected under illustration 4. A duty to heirs not to help incompetent clients execute wills would impair a lawyer’s duty to the client. (Id. at 980.)
The bottom line is that the lawyer’s duty to the non client who wished to inherit is narrow, occurring only when the lawyer intends to induce reliance or when the lawyer knows that the testator was trying to benefit the non-client. This opinion, in my view, is well-written and thoughtful and discusses the difficult conflicts that estate planners encounter.
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