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This is a legal malpractice case from Mississippi where the plaintiff hired an attorney, Omar Nelson, to bring a wrongful death action against the makers of Plavix. The plaintiff alleged that she asked Nelson to handle the case when he was an associate with the law firm, Sweet and Freese. Nelson declined and recommended other counsel. Later, when Nelson left Sweet and Freese, he began working on the case again. Eventually, Nelson obtained a settlement of $280,000 for the plaintiff. The settlement was approved by the court.

Plaintiff’s legal malpractice theory was that Nelson had not obtained a sufficient settlement for the case and that other lawyers would have obtained more. This theory, without further evidence of negligence such as a failure to take discovery or obtain evidence, is very weak. It is almost entirely speculative. How are we to know why a different attorney would have obtained more money than the attorney who actually handled the case?

Plaintiff’s expert was Freese who testified that had he handled the case he would have obtained more money for the plaintiff.

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Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed a legal fee award because the lawyers who obtained the award failed to retain copies of their written timesheets after they entered the data into a computer program. Aliano v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 143367.

The plaintiff sought recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act alleging that Sears had wrongfully collected sales tax on the entire sale price of certain digital-to-analog converter boxes even though a portion of the price was subsidized by a federal program which provided coupons that were exempt from Illinois sales tax.

Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining class certification and opted to go to trial. At trial, plaintiff prevailed and won a judgment of $3.10. Plaintiff then filed a fee petition seeking $252,402.08 in legal fees. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the petition for legal fees and awarded $157,813.53. Sears appealed. Opinion ¶ 3.

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The case at issue here, Tuggle Schiro & Lichtenberger, P.C., v. Country Preferred Insurance Company, 2015 IL App (4th) 141036-U is an unpublished opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District.

The fee dispute arose out of an automobile accident case. The plaintiff, Carroll Watson, who was insured by County Preferred suffered injuries as a result of an automobile accident. Watson hired Tuggle Schiro & Lichtenberger (Tuggle) to represent him in the litigation. Watson also submitted medical bills to County Preferred, which made payments directly to medical providers. The medical payments made by County Preferred exhausted the policy’s $50,000 limit of medical payments.

The Tuggle firm obtained a settlement of $100,000 from the party that caused the auto accident. Additionally, the Tuggle firm obtained a payment of $150,000 from County Preferred on Watson’s uninsured motorist coverage. County Preferred asserted its right to take a credit of $50,000 for payments it made for medical payments for Watson.

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In this case, a taxi driver was advised by his bankruptcy lawyers to file a Chapter 7 case. The lawyers apparently failed to realize that the taxi driver owned a taxi medallion and that, in a Chapter 7 case, the medallion would be sold by the Trustee to cover the taxi driver’s debts.

The case is unusual because the debtor obtained new counsel who converted his case from Chapter 7 (liquidation) to Chapter 11 (reorganization). Successor counsel also filed a legal malpractice claim in the bankruptcy court. That court held that the first set of bankruptcy lawyers were liable and awarded economic damages. The decision is summarized below:

On September 16, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court issued the PFC. PFC at 27. In the PFC, the Bankruptcy Court found that Defendants committed malpractice by advising Plaintiff to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7. PFC at 18. Specifically the Bankruptcy Court found that: (1) Defendants were aware that Plaintiff owned a taxicab and taxi medallion prior to Plaintiff filing under Chapter 7 bankruptcy, (2) Defendants acknowledged that advising Plaintiff to file under Chapter 7 was error given Plaintiff’s assets, (3) Defendants made numerous errors in preparation of the Chapter 7 petition and failed to adequately correct those errors, (4) Defendants “abandoned” Plaintiff by failing to address the Trustee’s motions or advise Plaintiff of his right to convert to a favorable chapter which led to substantial administrative expenses, and (5) Defendants’ negligent representation was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages. PFC at 14-20.

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The case is captioned Illinois State Bar Association Mutual Insurance Company v. Thomas W. Burkhart, et al., 2015 IL App (4th) 140936-U.

An attorney, Thomas Burkhart, represented Robert and Elizabeth Wilson in a real estate transaction and related litigation. That litigation ultimately resulted in a jury verdict of $30,000 for the Wilsons. Opinion ¶ 9. The proceeds were deposited with the Bank of Edwardsville.

In 2005, trouble arose when Burkhart filed a motion in the state court case seeking $35,806.85 in legal fees, apparently $5,806.85 more than the amount of the jury verdict. The Wilsons responded with a counterclaim for negligence and legal malpractice. Burkhart tendered the defense of the claims to ISBA Mutual, which agreed to pay for Burkhart’s defense.

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Source: MCZ DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC, Dist. Court, ND Illinois 2015 – Google Scholar

This case involves allegations that the law firm (Dickinson Wright) committed legal malpractice in connection with work on a proposed “Indian casino project” in Oklahoma.

During the representation Plaintiffs requested that the law firm “to provide an opinion on any issues that might preclude the proposed gaming project from successfully moving forward.”

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Source: GOESEL v. BOLEY INTERNATIONAL (HK) LTD., Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 2015 – Google Scholar

This case concerns an appeal by a law firm of a decision by the district court to reduce a contingent fee award.

The parties agreed to a contingent fee under which the lawyers would receive one-third of any award and the expenses would be covered by the clients.

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Source: Janousek v. KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, Ill: Appellate Court, 1st Dist., 2nd Div. 2015 – Google Scholar

Illinois has a two-year statute of limitations period which applies to legal malpractice claims. Here, the Appellate Court held that the two-year statute operated to bar claims against a law firm that allegedly assisted its client in a breach of fiduciary duty.

Facts:

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This case is captioned 2015 CO 61, Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the Town of Minturn: J. Tucker, Trustee v. Town of Minturn.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that a non-attorney trustee of a trust may not proceed pro se before the water court. The court reasoned that Tucker, a non-attorney, was acting not on his own behalf but was representing the rights of other people. Other courts have reached the same result. A trustee is a fiduciary who acts on behalf of others. He cannot act pro se for others. Instead, the trustee needs to retain a lawyer to represent the trust.

The ruling is consistent with long-standing practice and ethics rules. The trustee cannot proceed pro se because he is not licensed and may lack the training and experience to obtain the best result for his clients, the trust and its beneficiaries.

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This case is captioned Bode & Grenier, LLC v. Carroll L. Knight.

Carroll Knight retained the law firm, Bode & Grenier, LLC, to assist it with litigation and regulatory matters arising out of an oil spill of 100,000 gallons of oil on Carroll Knight’s property in Toledo, Ohio. The lawyers agreed to represent Carroll Knight on an hourly fee basis. After two years of litigation, Carroll Knight fell behind on its legal bills and entered into an agreement with the law firm. The agreement contained three components: (a) a retention letter; (b) a Promissory Note obligating Carroll Knight to pay $300,00o in past due legal fees; and (c) a Confession of Judgment.

On May 2, 2008, the firm filed an obtained a Confession of Judgment in the amount of $302,500.

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