Chicago Legal Malpractice Lawyer Blog
Campbell v. Law offices of Solomon Rosengarten, 241 A.D.3d 771 (2025), 238 N.Y.S.3d 679, 2025 NY Slip Op 04700, is a decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York reinstating a legal malpractice claim that the trial court had dismissed as time-barred. The explanation:
In 2016, Campbell executed a consent to change attorneys form and filed it in the Supreme Court, Kings County. Campbell then moved in the Supreme Court to restore the action to the active calendar, for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and for leave to file a note of issue. In an order dated November 22, 2017, the motion was denied without prejudice to refile in the Civil Court, Kings County. Campbell then moved in the Civil Court to restore the action to the active calendar and for summary judgment on the issue of liability. In an order dated December 10, 2019, the Civil Court denied the motion (hereinafter the Civil Court order).
In January 2020, Campbell commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice. The defendants moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice as time-barred. In an order dated May 25, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the motion. Campbell appeals.
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Here, the cause of action alleging legal malpractice was premised on the defendants’ neglect of the personal injury action. As pre-note of issue delay of a pending action is not necessarily injurious (see generally Lopez v Imperial Delivery Serv., 282 AD2d 190, 191 [2001]), the actionable injury in this case did not occur until the issuance of the Civil Court order, which prevented the plaintiff from further prosecuting the personal injury action (see Golden Jubilee Realty, LLC v Castro,196 AD3d 680, 683 [2021]; Frederick v Meighan, 75 AD3d 528, 532 [2010]; see also Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v Rubin, Fiorella & Friedman, LLP, 188 AD3d 530, 531 [2020]). Therefore, the cause of action alleging legal malpractice was timely, since it was asserted within three years of the issuance of the Civil Court order.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice as time-barred.